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Abstract 
 
Images are tools in the social construction of reality. The meaning of images is not a feature of the image 
itself but the outcome of a communicative process that involves a negotiation between social actors with a 
stake, interest and resources to participate in the process. In this perspective, visual communication is a 
form of communication in which images are used and meanings negotiated, constructed, challenged etc. 
In a political perspective, one that looks at the competition for the distribution of values in society, visual 
communication and communication in general are greatly influential in establishing who gets what, when 
and how. While some believe that the emancipative power of digital visuality consists in the fact that this 
is a form of visual communication that facilitates non institutional and amateur production and circulation 
of images, I claim that the emancipative potential of this as other forms depends on their effects on the 
process through which images are given meaning – supporting or undermining openness, diversity, etc. – 
and on the nature of the meanings that can – or cannot – find expression in this process. The approach of 
social representation provides a useful conceptual framework for the systematic study of the visual con-
struction of meaning in the digital age.   
 
 
Keywords: digital visuality, social representation, 9/11, Abu-Ghraib, Arab Spring, vis-
ual communication 
 
 
1 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VISUAL MEANING AND THE 
ROLE OF DIGITAL VISUALITY  
In a previous discussion (Stocchetti, 2014), I argued that the idea that digital visuality 
can have emancipative, political functions is based on problematic beliefs concerning 
the relation of visuality with truth, community and the construction of the real. These 
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beliefs are associated with the use of images in accordance with at least three main 
logics or “principles” which I described as follows: 
1. the “reality principle” or the idea that images can “show” or otherwise provide 
some important or truthful piece of information and that vision is associated with 
authoritative knowledge (“what you see is what you get”);   
2. the “pleasure principle”, or the idea that what really matters is not the infor-
mation an image provides and the relation between the image and what it shows, 
but rather the ritualistic use of the image in the constitution of a community of 
meaning and ultimately the relationship between individuals united by the fact 
of giving the same meaning to the same image;  
3. the “hyper-reality principle”, or the idea that an image, instead of providing in-
formation or performing a ritual can be a simulacra: a communicative tool used 
to actually “hide” rather than “showing” relevant aspects of reality.   
Implicit in these logics is a notion of meaning which contains at least two important fea-
tures. First, the meaning of images is not a permanent feature of the image itself but an 
impermanent outcome of a communicative process: the social construction of visual 
meaning. This process can be usefully looked at as a political process in which some 
participants are more influential than others and issues of meanings are always associat-
ed with issues of power. Second, if relations of power and relations of meaning are mu-
tually constitutive – each one depends on the other – the interpretation of the political 
role of visual communication has to face a fundamental problem of indeterminacy: rela-
tions of meaning cannot be determined independently from relations of power and vice 
versa. 
 
In this paper I will continue my discussion on the political role of digital visuality start-
ing from the last general hypothesis which may be useful to recall here: 
 
If digital visuality cannot credibly reduce the indeterminacy of visual communication in its conven-
tional functions of political propaganda and community building, one may still claim that, compared 
e.g. to conventional photography, digital visuality affects the social construction of reality in at least 
three ways. First, it opens up the practice of visual communication to large parts of the populations, 
blurring the distinction between producer, distributor and consumer of visual objects (…). Second, it 
enhances the productive capacity of visual technology beyond reality itself, into the hyper-real e.g. 
enabling the production of images that transcend the human perspective (…). Third, it performs as a 
logic for the representation of reality that have pedagogical implications and enhances the social value 
of visual communication in the social construction of reality (…) independently from reality itself. 
The combined effects of these three changes introduced by digital visuality, one may suggest, are 
‘emancipative’ on political grounds to the extent that their role is ‘subversive’ of the social construc-
tion of reality. Political emancipation, in other words, is associated to the dissolution of the relations 
of power legitimized by notions of truth and reality that are effectively challenged by the logic of digi-
tal visuality, the hyperrealism of its representations, and the widespread access to both. To change the 
world, one should first change the way we look at it. Digital visuality can help in looking the world 
not as it is but as it could be (utopia/dystopia). (Stocchetti, 2014) 
In the pages that follow, I look a bit deeper into the social construction of visual mean-
ing to understand the conditions which may foster or undermine the emancipative po-
tential of digital visuality in the social construction of visual meaning.   
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To look at these conditions, I will apply the theory of social representation to the analy-
sis of the social construction of visual meaning associated with the attacks of 9/11 and 
the events that followed - the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the abuses committed on 
Iraqi war prisoners at Abu Ghraib and the rebellions of the “Arab spring”.  
 
To anticipate the main points, my analysis reveals at least two grounds for scepticism. 
First, powerful ideological elements in the social construction of visual meaning are in-
fluential in dissolving the indeterminacy of digital visuality to the detriment of the 
emancipative encouragement of digital visuality. Second, the same discussion also dis-
closes the capacity of hegemonic representations to enforce selective usage of available 
visual technology: while the “radical potential” of digital visuality is thwarted, its in-
strumentality in support of hegemony if fully exploited. 
2 SOCIAL REPRESENTATION  
In its original formulation by Serge Moscovici - his study on the impact of psychoanal-
ysis on the French society of the late 50s and, in particular, on the social identities of 
Catholics and Communists (Moscovici, 1961) (Moscovici, 2008) - this approach ad-
dresses questions of meanings associated to the assimilation of scientific knowledge in 
society. Among the most relevant of these questions is social change, the communica-
tive construction of meaning and the adaptation of social identities to changes intro-
duced by scientific knowledge in the perception of the world. For our purpose, this ap-
proach contains at least two significant tenets. The first is that meaning is created in 
communicative practices. The second is that these communicative practices involve so-
cial identities in the double role of cause and effects: sources of change and passible of 
changes themselves. 
 
Empirical research on social representation focuses mostly on written and oral commu-
nication. Interest on visual communication has been scarce in the past but is now grow-
ing and the idea that images participate in important ways to the social representation of 
relevant phenomena has gained widespread currency (Howart, 2011) (De Rosa & Farr, 
2001) (Sen & Wagner, 2005).  
 
In applying the theory of social representation to the political role of digital visuality I 
am not claiming that images are empirical proofs concerning the nature of social repre-
sentation of phenomena. Rather I suggest that the process of social representation is in-
fluential in the attribution of socially relevant meaning to both images and phenomena. 
Furthermore, this approach helps the analysts to grasp the hermeneutic circle of visual 
meaning: the fact that, in the practices of visual communication, the phenomenon gives 
social meaning to the image as much as the image gives social meaning to the phenom-
enon.  
 
In this paper I cannot discuss exhaustively all the articulations, concept and tenets that 
animate the contemporary debate on social representation. What I would like to do, in-
stead, is to provide the reader with few, basic conceptual coordinates to grasp the heu-
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ristic opportunities offered by this approach to the study of visual communication
ii
. 
Simplified to the extreme, the basic conceptual framework for the approach of social 
representation should include at least the following concepts: event, themata, objectifi-
cation, naturalization and anchoring.   
2.1 The event 
The process of social representation is in essence a communicative process for the pro-
duction of meaning that is triggered by an event. This is a more or less dramatic occur-
rence, a phenomenon or an object that forces a re-definition of social identities by acti-
vating deeply seated ideas or beliefs called themata (see below). 
 
For Moscovici ‘a social representation emerges when there is a threat to the collective 
identity’ (Moscovici, 2008, p. 104): 
Let us simply recall that a social representation emerges when there is a threat to the collective identi-
ty, and when the communication of knowledge submerges the rules society has set itself. (Moscovici, 
2008, p. 104) 
For Wagner et al: 
Without an object being salient and relevant for a social group and hence entailing a public discourse 
and symbolic elaboration of the object, there is not much sense in looking for a shared representation 
(Wagner et al 1996, 347) 
Sakki notes that not the scientific but the social relevance of the object or phenomenon 
is the condition that leads to social representation 
The SRT [social representation theory, NdA] studies specific kinds of representations: those that have 
become the subject of public concern. They are thought about, discussed and they may cause tensions 
and provoke actions. Therefore, the object of study must be socially meaningful and necessitate com-
munication (Sakki, 2010, p. 76) 
The fundamental idea at the roots of social representation (in the singular as a process) 
is that a problem generates communication about the meaning of the problem itself. So-
cial representations (in the plural) are communicative objects emerging from the identi-
ty threats associated to the activation of themata by an event which have a traumatic 
impact on the community – e.g. war, revolutions etc. As we shall see in a moment, the 
exercise of organized violence is a special type of event that requires elaboration be-
cause of the ambivalent nature of this violence: both a problem and a solution for the 
integrity of the community. 
 
Digital visuality can play a fundamental role in the visual construction of the event. This 
is probably the single most important “point of entry” for the emancipative role of DV. 
But also the most jealously guarded prerogative of media organizations: to be first on 
                                               
ii For this purpose, and to avoid burdening this preliminary discussion, I will refer to the recent publication by Finnish 
social psychologist, Inari Sakki on the social representation of European identity in school textbook (Sakki, 2010). 
This work is, to my knowledge, the most recent and accurate description of the concepts and theoretical debates per-
taining to the theory of social representations in its current state. 
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the spot, to go “live”, etc. The visual construction of the event is a crucial stake in the 
competition for the control over the social construction of reality. Digital visuality facil-
itates the participation of individuals but organizational, cultural and legal factors still 
support the influence of institutional media – individual images about a certain event 
become relevant if and when appropriated by media organizations. This re-
appropriation is a form of usage that erodes or suppresses the radical potential of images 
by simply complying with the conventions, ‘styles’, legal provisions etc. that regulate 
media work (e.g. not showing dead bodies of ‘our’ soldier nor bodies of ‘their’ dead 
children in war coverage) 
2.2 Themata 
According to Inari Sakki: 
Themata are those ideas around which representations are constituted and which engender them. 
Therefore, they have a normative and generative power in the formation of social representations. 
Themata are shared knowledge or beliefs of which people implicitly or explicitly think and talk about, 
and which often are taken for granted. They are rooted in collective memory of a group. They may not 
be expressed aloud in communication but they underlie socially shared knowledge. They are a kind of 
a deep structure or representation and not always open to direct observation (Sakki, 2010, p. 61) 
Sakki notes that these themata are “deep” and difficult to observe presumably because 
they are either hidden also to those who share them (themata are semiconscious) or they 
are difficult to express (themata are irreducible to texts) or even sensitive aspects of 
people identity (themata are kept “secret” to avoid direct challenges to one’s identity). 
My suggestion here is that, if themata are both “social and deep”, relevant traces or 
signs of them should be found at cultural level or even – as I would argue in relation to 
the cases in exam here – at the level of institutionalized ideas e.g. in political theory or 
other forms of authoritative knowledge which can be associated to the object of repre-
sentation. 
 
The emancipative/subversive potential of digital visuality depends on its capacity to ac-
tivate emancipative/subversive themata. The problem here is to see if and when such 
things as ‘emancipative themata’ actually exist. In social representation theory, the no-
tions of ‘emancipated’ and ‘polemic’ representations designate representations shared 
by small groups or subgroups still compatible or in opposition to the ‘hegemonic’ repre-
sentations shared in some measure by all and constituting the ‘core’ of the social identi-
ty (Ben-Asher, 2003, pp. 6.3-6.4). One can probably find interpretation of themata with 
subversive implications e.g. re-interpretation, re-contextualization, etc. Ultimately it is 
all about subverting relations of meanings to subvert the relations of power based on 
them. The theory of social representation (supported by cultural and historical 
knowledge) helps identifying these themata and understanding their communicative 
values in the processes of social representation and in the social construction of visual 
meaning. 
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2.3 Objectification & Naturalization 
“Social representations – wrote Serge Moscovici – take shape according to two basic 
processes: objectification and anchoring” (Moscovici, 2008, p. 54) (Italics in the origi-
nal). In the description of Sakki, "objectification is a process where something abstract 
is transformed into something almost physical and concrete. It means translating some-
thing that exists in our thoughts into something that exists in reality" (Sakki, 2010, p. 
53). An especially interesting aspect of this process is its connection with visuality. As 
Sakki notes, "objectifying is to discover the iconic aspect of an ill-defined idea or being, 
that is, to match a concept with an image" (Sakki, 2010, p. 55). The idea behind this de-
scription is that images do in fact perform an important function of mediation between 
the world of ideas and the world of material object, transforming ideas (e.g. war) into 
objects (e.g. the images of war). For communicative purpose, concepts perform a rather 
similar function but objectification into an image seems to increase the intelligibility of 
a concept and therefore to facilitate its assimilation and divulgation, albeit in the simpli-
fied form of a visual image (De Rosa & Farr, 2001, pp. 6-7). This “simplification” or 
the transformation of a concept into an image is the temporary result of a negotiation 
over the conceptual meaning of images and it is in principle passible of further trans-
formation as result of dissemination and further negotiation. 
 
The idea expressed in the notion of naturalization or “...when something abstract be-
comes real”, and "an object become part of the social reality" (Sakki, 2010, pp. 55-56) 
points in my view, to the elements of continuity in the transformation of a concept into 
an image. In other words, it looks at the stage of the construction of meaning in which 
meanings are agreed upon and, to an extent, considered as “given” for further commu-
nication. In this communication, what is objectified/ naturalized in a given image or set 
of images, can be denaturalized if and when there are agents with enough interest and 
resources to effectively do that. In this sense, objectification and naturalization should 
not be considered static results of communicative process but communicative processes 
themselves through which the unfamiliar become familiar.  
 
The notions of objectification/naturalization assume but do not (yet) articulate the influ-
ence of visuality in concept formation and, or for our discussion, the influence of digital 
visuality in the autonomous formation of concepts by individuals and groups. What this 
notion suggests, in other words, is that the political role of digital visuality should be 
seen as mediated by (rather than alternative to) the role of concepts. In this perspective, 
the visual construction of concepts seems a fundamental process in the competition for 
the control over the social construction of reality. This process - the visual formation of 
concepts - is ultimately where the power of advertisement and propaganda rests: estab-
lishing representation of reality based on images/concepts that organize information ac-
cording to implicit hierarchies of values (e.g. the concept of citizenship based on the 
enmification of the non-citizens as in nationalistic propaganda)(see e.g. Roland Barthes 
Mythologies…. (Barthes, 1972) and Andrew Wernick, Promotional Culture (Wernick, 
1991). 
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2.4 Anchoring 
Anchoring is the “second major process” of social representation (Moscovici, 2008, p. 
104) whose main function is to make the unfamiliar familiar or, more precisely “to an-
chor strange ideas to reduce them to ordinary categories and images, to set them in a 
familiar context… which draws something foreign and disturbing that intrigues us into 
our particular system of categories…” (Moscovici, 1984, p. 29). 
 
More recently, Sakki describes anchoring as a process through which: 
New or strange phenomena-object, experiences, relations and practices are attached to everyday cate-
gories and worldviews and offered a familiar reference point. Anchoring integrates the emerging rep-
resentation into a network of significance, marked by social values, generating a system of interpreta-
tion (Sakki, 2010, p. 50).  
A further connotation… the notion of emotional anchoring seems particularly useful. 
Emotional anchoring and objectification are described as  
…communicative processes by which a new phenomenon is attached to well-known positive or nega-
tive emotions, for example fear or hope. In this way the unknown becomes recognizable as, for exam-
ple, a threat, a danger, or as something nice and pleasurable (Höijer, 2010, p. 719) 
Anchoring seems a crucial moment in the social construction of visual meaning. This is 
where disambiguation takes its final turn and, for example, the images of war or abuses 
are construed as images of victory or defeat, pleasure or pain, from the point of view of 
the victimizer or the victim, etc. However, since the meaning of the image is not a fea-
ture of the image but the outcome of the use of the image, images can be re-
appropriated and given very different meanings in alternative anchoring. 
 
3 DIGITAL VISUALITY AND THE POLITICS OF MEANING: 
FROM 9/11 TO THE “ARAB SPRING”  
In ‘The Spirit of Terrorism’, Baudrillard argues that, after the “stagnation of the 
1990s…with the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, we might even be 
said to have before us the absolute event, the ‘mother’ of all events, the pure event unit-
ing within itself all the events that have never taken place” (Baudrillard, 2003 (2002), 
pp. 3-4). Interpreted in its symbolical dimension as a “humiliation” (Baudrillard, 2003 
(2002), p. 100) those attacks posed a serious threat to the credibility of beliefs concern-
ing fundamental aspects of US collective identity (e.g. exceptionalism, invulnerability, 
moral supremacy, etc.) and therefore to the integrity of that identity. It was this event 
and this threat that generated the social representation as a communicative and defen-
sive response to that threat. 
 
In the terms of the theory of social representation, therefore, 9/11 is the event that gen-
erates social representation and activates at least one fundamental themata that pre-
existed the event itself: the relationship between West/US capitalism and Islam con-
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strued in terms of a competition between societies based on incompatible hierarchies of 
values. 
 
The visual imagery used in the news coverage of that event - the images of the Twin 
Towers, violated, burning and collapsing associated to the images of Arab people cele-
brating the attacks as a victory – participated to the construction of the event itself as a 
trauma. It established the fundamental ambivalence that accompanies the hetero-
referential visual representation of competitive in-group vs. out-group relationship (Sen 
& Wagner, 2005): the suffering of one is the pleasure of the other.  
 
In this traumatic event, images participate to the social construction of meaning. In all 
their functions - performing truth claims following the “reality principle”, community 
building in the logic of the “pleasure principle” or even as simulacra, hiding to Ego im-
portant aspects concerning Alter - images play a fundamental role in constituting an in-
fluential context for the experiencing of other events (the US led invasion of Iraq, the 
abuses at Abu Ghraib and the “Arab spring”) and the interpretation of the relative im-
agery.  
 
Digital visuality multiply the point of views of the visual coverage of the attacks of 
9/11..capturing the moment of the impact from when we were, somewhere in New York 
or in Europe, the Middle East, or elsewhere….a gaze unified by available technology 
AND the value of the event, itself a function of the symbolic values of the place (New 
York as the cultural capital of a certain idea of “West”) and the glamour of the feat (two 
airplanes in two skyscrapers in a few minutes!) and all this in real time and in associa-
tion with the celebrations in the Arab world…..simultaneity and juxtaposition that af-
fects the social construction of that event as a) trauma, b) a war…  
3.1 Themata 
To my knowledge, the only subversive idea associated to 9/11 was formulated by 
Baudrillard when, commenting in the aftermath of that event, he wrote: 
The fact that we have dreamt of this event, that everyone without exception has dreamt of it – because 
no one can avoid dreaming of the destruction of any power that has become hegemonic to this degree 
– is unacceptable. Yet it is a fact, and one which can indeed be measured by the motive of violence of 
all that has been said and written in the effort to dispel it. At a pinch, we can say that they did it, but 
we wished for it. If this is not taken into account, the event loses any symbolic dimension.… This 
goes far beyond hatred for the dominant world power among the disinherited and the exploited, 
among those who have ended up on the wrong side of the global order. Even those who share in the 
advantages of that order have this malicious desire in their hearts. Allergy to any definitive order, to 
any definitive power, is – happily – universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center were per-
fect embodiments, in their very twinness, of that order. (Baudrillard, 2003 (2002), p. 6) 
The themata associated to this idea is that of revenge or justice for humiliations inflicted 
upon others in the history of globalization and before - ideas that are too complex to be 
suitable for the reduction into “live” coverage and too painful to be handled by a com-
munity facing the agony of awakening to its own vulnerability.  
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The other and more acceptable – from the perspective of the US society - themata is that 
of the “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1998). Activated by 9/11, this themata ac-
companies the interpretation of the US led invasion of Iraq but also, although in differ-
ent forms, the abuses of Abu Ghraib and the Arab Spring. In this latter case, the ideas 
expressed by Francis Fukuyama in its formulation of “the end of history” (Fukuyama, 
2006) add to the idea of contraposition between West/US capitalism and Islam the idea 
of intrinsic superiority of the former. In the light of this themata the images of the Arab 
spring can be interpreted as a reassuring “sign” of victory for a representation of the 
West/US construed around the core values of corporate capitalism and representative 
democracy at a moment when these values are challenged within the West itself 
(McKinley, 2007) – most visibly by the “Occupy wall street” movement in the very 
same days of the early revolts in those Arab countries 
 
A further themata with deep roots in US political culture is the role of US power in 
world affair and the competition between the main ideologies in US foreign policy in-
ternationalism vs. nationalism (Shurman, 1974). In the aftermath of 9/11, this themata 
has been influential in the re-definition of US collective identity, e.g. anchoring the vis-
ual coverage of the invasion of Iraq in terms of “repressed revenge” as a response to the 
different normative imperatives which followed from different ideological interpretation 
9/11: Serving the “international community”, performing as the policeman of the new 
world order eliminating a common threat vs. serving national interest and restoring the 
national self-image by revenging the attacks on 9/11.  
 
Finally, the feminization of the enemy is a themata that in both cases of the invasion of 
Iraq and Abu Ghraib, opens up interpretative avenues that I have discussed elsewhere in 
relation to the WAR is LOVE metaphor (Stocchetti, 2009). Put briefly , metaphoric as-
sociations tend to be bidirectional, and the roles of source and target domain inter-
changeable – which in practice means that  if WAR IS LOVE then LOVE IS WAR. 
Looked at in terms of themata, this idea perform the legitimization of violence and the 
actions of the victimizer on the victim in terms of intentions of the former – as in the 
belief that a certain degree of violence is inherent in passionate relationship expressed in 
the Latin sentence “vis grata puella”. Rooted in deep structures of meaning associated to 
patriarchal conservatism and reactionary ideologies, this idea express its generative 
power in all three the cases in exam: in the visual coverage of the invasion of Iraq, with 
the moralization of violence and military technology, in the images of abuses at Abu 
Ghraib and the feminization of war prisoners, and in the celebration of civil strife in the 
visual representation of the Arab Spring.  
3.2 Objectifications 
The visual coverage of the attacks of 9/11, the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the 
abuses at Abu Ghraib and the Arab spring objectifies/naturalizes those events in terms 
of acts of visual display. The concept of visual display in the media, discussed by Anne 
Koski (2011), describes the performativity of visual coverage as a form of a speech act 
that, when performed in public by an official representative of the state, “can be inter-
preted as a purposeful signal” which is “simultaneously intentional and conventional”  
(Koski, 2011, pp. 93-95). The act of visual display therefore can be seen as a political 
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act whose intelligibility depends on ritual functions based on existing structures of 
meaning but that, in the achievement of specific communicative goals (e.g. signaling 
American military supremacy) is not constrained by ritualistic meaning. Furthermore, 
acts of visual display are associated to the symbolic expression of power, inviting par-
ticipation from a particular point of view associated to implicit hierarchies of values in 
the effort of influencing the social construction of socially relevant meaning. These hi-
erarchies and the point of view itself can be endorsed or rejected but cannot be ignored 
because embedded in the visual object and the empirical reality of the viewer. Objectifi-
cation in terms of an act of visual display establishes a common experiential back-
ground for very different opinions about the event themselves. The experience of vio-
lence is reduced to visual participation, from a particular point of view, for both those 
who enjoy it and those who don’t.  In the coverage of Iraq wars visual participation en-
forced the point of view of the US and its allies. For the abuses at Abu Ghraib the point 
of view was that of the victimizer. For the Arab Spring the point of view was, ambiva-
lently, that of the demonstrators as endorsed by Western (mostly BBC and CNN) media.   
 
In the war coverage of the US led invasion of Iraq in BBC World and CNN Internation-
al, as presumably in other broadcasting, war was objectified in a form of visual commu-
nication where the goal was not primarily that of providing information but rather that 
of inducing involvement on one of the sides – the one who could safely ‘embed’ jour-
nalist and cameraman i.e. the one who could control the visual communication about the 
war itself. This form of coverage was part of the war itself: the visual experience of the 
phenomenon, part of the phenomenon and it can be interpreted as an act of visual vio-
lence. Watching the agony of Iraqi military from the camera of an incoming missile, or 
in the green light of Allied night vision devices are form of communicative behavior 
based on applications of digital visuality that enforce on the viewer the point of view of 
the victimizer. If we think that Iraqi people saw on BBC and CNN the same images of 
the “sweaty watcher” described by Nicholas Mirzoeff in his Watching Babylon 
(Mirzoeff, 2005, pp. 1-2), we can understand  how this type of broadcasting can perform 
as an act of visual violence in which the victim can see the consummation of her fate 
with the eyes of the victimizer – a bit like the young woman that in the movie “Strange 
Days” is forced to see her rape “live” with the eyes of her rapist. This form of objectifi-
cation – the reduction of war to its visual experience – preserves the ambivalence intrin-
sic to visual communication. In fact, the nature of this involvement is also ambivalent, 
contingent on conditions independent from the nature of the visual text - joyful partici-
pation for those who shared the need for revenge - like the sweaty watcher in Mirzoeff 
description - a sort of revulsion for those who did not - like Baudrillard in ‘War Porn’ 
(Baudrillard, 2006) and Mirzoeff himself - and presumably anything in between. Once 
the experience of war is objectified/naturalized in terms of an act of visual display, the 
paradoxical logic of the “society of spectacle” kicks in irresistibly (Debord, 2002 
(1967)): “The spectacle is not a collection of images, but a social relation among people, 
mediated by images… it is a world vision which has become objectified” (Debord, 2002 
(1967)). Once the collective experience of war is successfully objectified/naturalized in 
terms of an act of visual display not much can be done against the possibility that war 
itself could be experienced in the terms of visual pleasure - as Mirzoeff bitterly observes 
– or to inhibit the social construing of visual war coverage as “real” entertainment com-
pared to the “fictional” entertainment of war movies and war games.  
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The images of the abuses committed on Iraqi war prisoners at Abu were privately pro-
duced and therefore hardly imputable or interpretable in terms of a more or less deliber-
ate act of psychological warfare. The objectification/naturalization of those images in 
term of an act of visual display should be interpreted on the double track of overt and 
latent meaning. Overtly they were a proof that abuses were committed. Latently, they 
were a proof of the repressed desire of revenge that instigated the war. If the institution-
al war coverage managed to construe the war as an exercise of organized violence based 
on “precise weapons”, inspired by the security of the “international community” and 
implemented professionally and almost deprived of hatred (sine ira et sine studio), the 
images of Abu Ghraib were a window on the private dimension of the war. The act of 
visual display itself was a negation of the institutional interpretation – proving it false – 
and a reaffirmation of the hatred and the desires of revenge that institutional war cover-
age tried to hide. In continuity with the war coverage, however, those images enforce 
participation from the point of view of the victimizer(s): we are shown what the photog-
rapher saw, a selection of his/her field of visible reality based on his/her emotional en-
gagement with the events. Also in continuity with the psychological dimension of war-
fare, those images performed the “feminization of the enemy” which was an extension 
of a narrative logic of the ideological justification for the invasion of Iraq (Stocchetti, 
2009). 
 
The visual coverage of the Arab spring, at least in its initial phases, is an act of visual 
display in which, like in the invasion of Iraq and the abuses of Abu Ghraib, Western au-
diences are shown the ongoing events from the point of view or the “gaze” that are clos-
er to the in-group/identity defined in terms of West/US capitalism. Like in the case of 
Abu Ghraib, circulating images are for the most part privately produced by local partic-
ipants. Unlike Abu Ghraib and in a fashion closer to the uses of images in the invasion 
of Iraq, the institutional appropriation of private images performs ideological functions, 
re-construing the event in relation to the themata (e.g. clash of civilizations) activated 
by 9/11. At least as experienced in Western media the visual coverage of the Arab 
Spring construes and celebrates digital visuality as a technology of freedom which al-
lows both the political exposure of authoritarian regimes (reality principle and truth 
claim of images) and the mobilization against them (pleasure principle and community 
building). Digital technology/visuality are represented as “democratic” and digital cam-
era as democratic “weapons” against undemocratic regimes (BBC, 2011a) (BBC, 
2011b). It can be argued that while the democratic nature of digital technology is dis-
puted by digital surveillance in US, China, Iran etc., the idea that digital camera can be 
effective “weapons” against undemocratic regime is a dangerous metaphor that recog-
nizes the instrumental value of visual communication but misconstrue the conditions of 
its efficacy: it gives power not to unorganized masses but to the agents or the political 
actors that can make a politically effective use of images. We see pictures taken by the 
people directly experiencing those events on BBC or CNN because those images have 
been appropriated by these organizations and because the regimes affected by the “Arab 
Spring” do not yet have the capacity neither to control the circulation of digital images 
nor to mount an effective counter-campaign. In this sense one may indeed claim that 
these regimes surely underestimated the communicative potential of digital visuality. 
Quite obviously, this is something else than claiming that digital cameras are the weap-
ons of democracy: digital images and technology are “weaponized”, only if and when 
used by influential actors in coordinated visual strategy.  
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3.3 Anchoring 
The coverage of the US led invasion of Iraq in BBC World and CNN International par-
ticipated to the socio-institutional effort of constructing the war as an act of justice 
which repressed a more fundamental need of revenge.  Institutional discourse anchored 
the experience of 9/11 as an act of war, a humiliation and ultimately a trauma for Amer-
ican national identity comparable to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941: a 
shock whose detrimental effects on the collective identity could be overcome or healed 
only with the total defeat and humiliation of the offender
iii
. Although the anchoring of 
the US led invasion of Iraq war in terms of revenge seems plausible, my suggestion is 
that, at least in the institutional forms of BBC World and CNN International war cover-
age, the visual representation of the invasion was inspired by the need of repressing, ra-
ther than expressing, the revenge motives. I am using the term ‘repressing’ and not 
‘concealing’ here because “denial” seems a more plausible term than “lying” when dis-
cussing the responses to traumas threatening collective identities. Not only a war of re-
venge would have undermined the politics of war, but ‘justice’ is preferable to ‘revenge’ 
as a motive in the self-representation and legitimation of US as a “policeman”.   
 
The images of Abu Ghraib are an ambivalent proof of the abuses and of the repressed 
desires of revenge. They can be enjoyed or rejected as a continuation of the “visual 
pleasure” from the war, but also enjoyed or rejected as the unveiling of the repression at 
work in the visual construction of the war – disturbing because it showed the “true na-
ture” of US intervention: not bringing justice in the name of the “international commu-
nity” but satisfying the frustrated need of revenge for the humiliation inflicted by the 
attacks of 9/11. The anchoring process itself takes different connotations depending on 
the social functions one attributes to visual communication. As proof of the abuses, 
those images can be interpreted and used for their truth claim based on the “reality prin-
ciple”: the idea that digital images can show events more directly and efficiently than 
other forms or representation. As proof of repressed desires of revenge, however, those 
images are associated to the “pleasure principle” and the idea that the correspondence 
between the images and the reality is less important than the relationship created among 
individuals that give those images a particular meaning. In this perspective, as visual 
representation of repressed desires of revenge – along ethnic, cultural, political and even 
gender lines - the images of Abu Ghraib perform community building functions. They 
did so as empirical objects whose relevant social meaning is construed through opposi-
tional anchoring: one either enjoys the sight of humiliation or feels humiliated. Looked 
through the lenses of the “war on terror” and the polarization of political identities 
(“with us or against us”), the images of Abu Ghraib provided the opportunity to engage 
the constitution of social identities on hetero-referential (Sen & Wagner, 2005) and 
emotional grounds (Höijer, 2010)): “If you enjoy the sight you are with us; If you feel 
humiliated you are against us”.  
 
From a political point of view, however, the constitution of identity on emotional 
grounds creates more problems than it solves, especially if the goal is to overcome the 
                                               
iii The campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan probably did not offer a victory comparable to that on Japan and 
Iraq become a suitable scapegoat. Not by chance, as the peace treaty with Japan in 1945 was signed on the USS Mis-
souri, Bush delivered is “victory speech” from the USS Abraham Lincoln 2003. 
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traumatic effects of 9/11 on US/Western and possibly Islamic identities. By enforcing 
emotional anchoring on social categorization (the distinction between in-group and out-
group), and coupling or “tying up” feelings with loyalties, the possibility opens up for 
(in)voluntary violations of the in-group/out-group divides. In practice, some of “us” 
may indeed feel humiliated and may decide to actually leave the “in-group” as con-
strued in the oppositional representation of the West/US capitalism vs. Islam. The 
cleavage those images created within the “US/West” collective identity is an important 
one and its political implications should not be underestimated. Politician can tell peo-
ple what to think and be more or less successful in their propaganda efforts. But when it 
comes to the problem of how to feel the task seems more complicated and indetermina-
cy more influential. 
 
The images of Abu Ghraib where also re-appropriated. Cultural re-appropriation can be 
considered as a form of communicative behavior symptomatic of a collective need to 
come to terms with the visual evidence of an event that undermines the in-group cohe-
sion and the representation of collective identity possibly more than the event itself. In 
one of such instances of re-appropriation, Columbian artist Fernando Botero offers a 
visualization of the abuses to produce an explicit association with Picasso’s Guernica 
based on the conceptualization of art as “permanent accusation”iv In another instance, 
the re-appropriation of the images of Abu Ghraib in the form of fetishist practices is a 
form of ambivalent anchoring that subverts the relationship between the victim and the 
victimizer from one of “abuse” to one of “complicity”. Also in this case the pleasure 
principle is at work and the relation of meaning among the member of the in-group is 
prioritized over the relationship between the image and the event it portrays (reality 
principle). I should add that both these instances of cultural re-appropriation of the im-
ages of Abu Ghraib are also acts of visual displays whose intelligibility depends on the 
images of abuses that institutionalizes the normative function of art, in one instance, and 
the subversion of the victim-victimizer relationship in terms of mutual pleasure in the 
other. While the former performs conventional or “modern” esthetic functions (e.g. the 
hypostatization of the abuses in a work of art), the latter is more compatible with the 
consumerist styles that Frederic Jameson attributes to the cultural logic of late capital-
ism (Jameson, 1991): the decoupling of the signifiers (photo of abuses) from the signi-
fied (the abuses) and the repositioning of the latter in the domain of fetishism as a pri-
vate and rightful enjoyment. 
 
The anchoring in terms of revenge applies equally well to the relevant social meaning of 
those images in expressing repressed desires but also in feeding more or less conscious 
desires of revenge, especially in communities whose identity is associated to the image 
of abused Iraqi soldiers. The images of Abu Ghraib are traumatic also for Arab identity 
(and the nature of this trauma can be looked at in both its cultural and gender connota-
tions) and it would be interesting to see how those images and the event they refer to 
generates social representation as a defensive response. One can only presume that the 
idea of revenge (like the themata of the “clash of civilizations”) is quite influential and 
relevant also in the discussion about the cultural roots of Islamic terrorism – a most in-
teresting topic but one we cannot discuss here.   
 
                                               
iv See Fernando Botero at  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fernando_Botero (last visited 22.02.2012 
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If 9/11 is considered an event that triggers a collective representational need (which I 
discuss here in terms of the social construction of visual meaning), the concept of re-
venge opens up some interesting interpretative avenues also in the case of the images 
the Arab “spring”. Those of us old enough to remember the Prague Spring during the 
Cold War, must have wondered what was the ground for the naming of the rebellions in 
some Arab countries as “Arab spring”. The Prague Spring was an effort to reform soviet 
communism which ended in the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet Union in 1968. 
The Arab spring is a sequence of insurrections against more or less authoritarian re-
gimes in some Arab countries which at least in one case – Libya – has led to a civil war 
but no foreign invasions so far – if one does not consider NATO intervention in support 
of the rebels and with Syria as a possible candidate to be an exception. If on historical 
grounds the differences outweigh the similarities, on ideological grounds the association 
is actually quite plausible. The idea of revenge is here construed on the ideological di-
mension of a competition that during the Cold War was between the capitalist West 
against the communist East but that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, some believe 
is between the West/US capitalism and Islam.  
 
In this line of interpretation, the images of the Arab “spring” are an act of visual display 
that celebrate the power of the West/US capitalism in both its technological (digital 
cameras that circumvent regimes censorship) and ideological (the advancement of de-
mocracy) dimensions. In this act, visual communication in general and digital visuality 
in particular, are construed as the tools that allows access to “truth”, circumventing the 
control of local regimes but also offering the technological infrastructure for Western 
media (e.g. BBC International) to re-appropriate those images. In this process of re-
appropriation the notion of revenge seems a plausible interpretative key in terms of both 
the truth claim and the community building functions associated to the usage of (digital) 
imagery (Stocchetti, 2014). In relation to their truth claim or the “reality principle”, 
those images are anchored in the idea that (Western) democracy is advancing in those 
countries. Equipped with digital cameras and other communicative tools provided by 
available (Western) technology, the people of those countries are portrayed in the pro-
cess of “becoming like us” which is itself a sign of the hegemonization of American 
identity threatened by 9/11 and re-defined by the “war on terror”. In this perspective the 
cultural re-appropriation by Western media supports the idea of the inevitable advance 
of (Western) democracy, famously discussed by Francis Fukuyama in the aftermath of 
the Cold War
v. In relation to the community building function or the “pleasure princi-
ple”, those images are anchored in the idea that the advancement of democracy - and the 
transformation of “they” into “us” is actually a victory of the West in the clash of civili-
zations prophesized by Samuel P. Huntington at the turn of the century. In the cultural 
re-appropriation of those images from this standpoint, the visual saga of the Gadhafi 
resistance, escape and eventual assassination is an element of particular significance for 
the anchoring in revenge and one that connects the Arab spring with the invasion of Iraq 
(the images of dead Saddam and his sons) and the “war on terror” (the images of dead 
Osama Bin Laden). In this anchoring, the representation of suffering and the victimiza-
tion of local population by their rulers are appropriated by both the West/US and the 
                                               
v As a note one can only note the difference in the institutional re-appropriation of the imagery associated to the Oc-
cupy Wall Street movement that in the very same days of the early Arab Spring, was demonstrating against the dis-
tortions introduced in the US democracy by financial capitalism. My impression is that while the latter is construed as 
a democratic rebellion the former is construed as a civic disturbance. 
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Islamists. But if for the West/US the victims of the regimes are the proof of the regime’s 
illegitimacy, for local Arab audiences the illegitimacy of the regime does not requires 
proof and its victims are martyrs for Islam. If this would be true, and the social con-
struction of visual suffering in the Arab Spring does indeed follow very different an-
choring in the West/US compared to local audiences, the anchoring in term of revenge 
and the cultural re-appropriation in the terms of “necessary” or “enforced” advancement 
of democracy by Western media would have performed at least one important 
(dis)function of propaganda: blinding domestic publics to the fact that the insurrections 
of the Arab spring paved the way for the advance of Islamist organizations. 
 
The main points of my discussion and some questions concerning the role of digital vis-
uality are tentatively summarized below
vi
.  
                                               
vi A special thanks to Inari Sakki for her comments and help in the compilation of this chart.  
  
EVENT 9/11 
What is the role of digital visuality 
(DV) in the visual construction of 
the event? 
Main THEMATA WEST/US CAPITALISM vs. ISLAM 
other themata 
GOOD vs. EVIL, DEMOCRACY vs. TERROR/DICTATORSHIP, HUMAN vs. 
ANIMAL, MASCULINE vs. FEMININE 
Can DV activate alternative/emancipative/subversive Themata? 
CONTEXTS Iraq 2003  Abu Ghraib Arab Spring 
 
(themata US-Islam)  (themata human-animal) (themata democracy-dictatorship) 
masculine-feminine)  
 Institutional DV  Informal/private DV 
Informal/private DV re-appropriated 
by media orgs. 
Can DV resists institutional re-appropriation? 
OBJECTIFICATIONS war/violence  torture, abuses demonstrations 
(most common visualiza-
tions) 
Saddam/Bin Laden  American soldier twitter, digital camera etc. 
-Arab victims Gadhafi 
DV is itself a representation of the West/US capitalism/freedom 
ANCHORS act of war  
enjoyment/disgust  
(emotional anchoring) 
Prague spring (naming) 
 
trauma/pearl harbour 
fear (emotional anchoring) 
 pleasure, humiliation 
victory of capitalism/democracy, 
superiority of the West 
Common anchoring  
for all cases: 
Revenge 
Can DV influence anchoring? 
IDENTITY  
FUNCTIONS 
re-definition to overcome the 9/11 trauma  Revenge vs. justice 
Reassurance about West/US capital-
ism 
polarization/polemic of American identities (in- and out-groups) 
 
Figure 1. Social representations and visual communication: a provisional conceptual framework 
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
On a general note, I am indeed tempted to agree with Brian Winston when, in open con-
trast with Marshall McLuhan, he suggested that available technology is not a cause but 
an effect of social order and “law of the suppression of radical potential” is decisive in 
making sure that technological innovation cannot produce non incremental change or 
“revolution” in the former (Winston, 1986)[see also (Traber, 1986)].  
 
Digital visuality is a form of visual technology with emancipative or even subversive 
potentials to the extent it facilitates the participation of more and more diverse social 
identities, interests and hierarchies of value to the social construction of visual meaning. 
The actual expression of this potential however is far from granted. 
 
Visual communication has distinctive aspects of indeterminacy that in particular cir-
cumstances (e.g. redefinition of traumatized social identities) creates opportunities for 
emancipation. Hegemonic ideology, however, is productive: it responds actively to 
challenges and can inhibit emancipative potentialities if and when they emerge. The “… 
pure and random play of signifiers…” (Jameson, 1991, p. 96) which digital visuality 
seems so decisive in bringing about is not a weakness but the very strength of the cul-
tural logic of late capitalism, and the very reason of its resistance.  
 
If every signifier were always autonomous from every signified communication and un-
derstanding would be simply impossible. In practice, communication and understanding 
happen all the time but, if we are interested in relations of power, we may usefully no-
tice that some understandings are more influential than others. To enforce the emancipa-
tive potential of digital visuality – as well as other forms of communication - we have to 
gain a better grasp on the conditions of this autonomy since taken in its absolute form, 
this autonomy reflects an epistemological standpoint that undermines the emancipative 
potential of digital visuality because it erodes the ideological impact of diversity in the 
visual construction of reality but not the effects of the hegemonic influences it de-
scribes. 
 
If suggesting that ‘resistance is futile' may  perform as a self-fulfilling prophecy, the in-
fluence of ideological elements in repressing the radical potential of digital visuality 
should not be underestimated. In fact, the autonomy of the signifier, and the commodifi-
cation of culture associated to it, cannot be associated to semantic chaos but rather the 
hegemonic control on the social construction of meaning. While every individual is in 
principle capable of giving meaning - and a given image can be given as many different 
meanings as there are individuals using it - in my discussion I prefer to use the notion of 
relevant social meaning to describe the impermanent outcome of the social construction 
of visual meaning and to capture the influence of ideology in this process. For our dis-
cussion, this notion suggests at least two important points. First that the meaning of im-
ages is constructed not independently from, but functionally connected to, the purposes, 
interests, values, histories, etc. of the most influential among the agents participating in 
the process. Second, that even if the meaning of images is ambiguous, disambiguation is 
possible because the viewers never see images in a vacuum. The context of the uses of 
images contains situational clues that perform like interpretative keys for the decoding 
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of the image and disambiguation. This process of disambiguation is relevant for the vis-
ual construction of reality: the process in which images and visual communication are 
used in the representation of relevant social issues. 
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